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Essay 
Connecting the Rule of Recognition and Intentionalist 
Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of Richard Kay 
LARRY ALEXANDER 
In this piece, I take up two topics that have been preeminent in the 
scholarship of Richard Kay: the fundamental norm that is the foundation of legal 
systems, and the proper object of the interpretation of constitutional and statutory 
texts, namely, the texts’ authors’ intended meaning. My aim is to show how these 
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Connecting the Rule of Recognition and Intentionalist 
Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of Richard Kay 
LARRY ALEXANDER * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor and a pleasure to participate in this celebration of the 
career of Richard Kay. Rick and I go way back. And although we live at 
opposite ends of this continental country, the distance between our views 
on the topics of our mutual interest is, if it exists, microscopic. Or at least 
that is how I understand Rick’s views.  
The two areas of Rick’s interest and mine that I shall address are the 
foundations of legal systems and legal interpretation as a quest for 
lawmakers’ intended meanings. Rick has written extensively about both 
topics.1 I have written extensively about the second but much less about the 
first.2 What neither of us has written about explicitly, however, is what, if 
                                                                                                                     
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I want to thank Jim 
Allan and Steve Smith for their comments, and Joe Bsaibes and Noah Gaarder-Feingold for their 
excellent research assistance. 
1 For Kay’s work on the foundations of legal systems, see RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS 
REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014); Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 715 (2011); Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31 (2000); 
Richard S. Kay, William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645 (2000); Richard S. 
Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57 (1987); Richard S. Kay, 
Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). For Kay’s work on legal and especially 
constitutional interpretation, see Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the 
Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2017); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention 
and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); Richard S. Kay, 
“Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 335 (1996); 
William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Legitimacy of the Constitutional Judge and Theories of 
Interpretation in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 517 (1994); Richard S. Kay, Original 
Intentions, Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 39 
(1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).  
2 LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING chs. 5–6 (2008); 
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW ch. 5 (2001); Larry Alexander, Goldsworthy on Interpretation of Statutes and 
Constitutions: Public Meaning, Intended Meaning and the Bogey of Aggregation, in LAW UNDER A 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY (Lisa Burton Crawford 
et al. eds., 2019); Larry Alexander, Law and Politics: What is Their Relation?, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 355 (2019); Lawrence A. Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist?, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD 
DWORKIN 299 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2016); Larry Alexander, Legal Positivism and 
Originalist Interpretation, 16 REVISTA ARG. DE TEORIA JURIDICA (2015); Larry Alexander, Hart and 
Punishment for Negligence, in HART ON RESPONSIBILITY (Christopher G. Pulman ed., 2014); Larry 
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any, is the connection between these two topics. That connection is what I 
shall try to establish here. 
I. KAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
The article that first acquainted me with Rick the scholar was his 1981 
piece Preconstitutional Rules,3 which appeared in a symposium issue of 
the Ohio State Law Journal in which I also contributed a piece.4 In Rick’s 
piece, he points out that the U.S. Constitution is the touchstone of legal 
validity in the U.S. legal system only because of something more 
fundamental than the Constitution–what Rick calls a “preconstitutional 
rule.” Rick’s notion of a preconstitutional rule is, as Rick acknowledges,5 
equivalent to what H. L. A. Hart called a “rule of recognition”6 in The 
Concept of Law.7 
Rick points out that constitutional decisions can be criticized as 
inconsistent with the preconstitutional rule. A decision that misinterprets 
the Constitution but does not question the preconstitutional rule that 
establishes the Constitution as fundamental law is obviously criticizable as 
legally erroneous.8 But one can also criticize the preconstitutional rule 
itself, not on legal grounds–for it is the foundation of the legal system–but 
                                                                                                                     
Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623 
(2014); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013); Larry 
Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Larry 
Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010); Larry Alexander, Waluchow’s—Living 
Tree Constitutionalism, 29 LAW & PHIL. 93 (2009); Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead 
Hands: The Interpretation of Constitutions and Constitutional Rights, 22 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 227 
(2009); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and 
the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Larry Alexander, How to 
Understand Legislatures: A Comment on Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, and Rodriguez, 44 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 993 (2007); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why 
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004); Larry Alexander 
& Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Rules: The Nature and Limits of Inchoate Intentions, in LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION IN DEMOCRATIC STATES 3 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds., 2002); Larry 
Alexander, On Statutory Interpretation: Fancy Theories of Interpretation Aren’t, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 
1081 (1995); Larry Alexander, Originalism, or Who is Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 321 (1995); 
Larry Alexander, All of Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in 
LAW AND INTERPRETATIONS: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 
3 Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 187. 
4 Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and 
Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1981). 
5 See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 189–90 (discussing Hart’s “rule of 
recognition”). 
6 Id. at 100–02. 
7 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
8 Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 190. 
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on moral or prudential grounds.9 Why, for example, should we be bound 
by legal norms established over 200 years ago by privileged white males, 
some of whom owned slaves? Why should the preconstitutional rule, the 
rule of recognition, recognize their constitution as fundamental law rather 
than some other possible constitution more apt for the country and world 
we inhabit today? 
Rick notes that there are also two non-evaluative questions we can ask 
about the preconstitutional rule. We can ask what is the preconstitutional 
rule–what does it prescribe (its content)–and we can ask whose say so 
determines what it is.10 Rick takes as a given in the article that the answer 
to the latter question is that it is the Supreme Court’s understanding of the 
preconstitutional rule that counts.11 In this respect, Rick is following Hart, 
who argued that the rule of recognition is established by its acceptance as 
such by officials.12 
Here I want to pause. There is an obvious bootstrap quality in Hart’s 
claim that rules of recognition are established by virtue of their acceptance 
by officials. For what makes officials official? Being an official is not 
something bestowed by nature, like being female or being over six feet tall. 
One is an official because one meets criteria established by law. But the 
law that makes one an official is law because it is valid within a legal 
system, which in turn rests on a rule of recognition, which in turn, 
according to Hart, exists because of acceptance by officials.13 In other 
words, one is an official by virtue of accepting the system that makes one 
an official. Nice work if you can get it. 
Obviously, then, there has to be more than official acceptance to 
establish a rule of recognition. Alfred’s accepting a rule of recognition that 
recognizes as a legal norm “Alfred is an official” will not by itself make 
Alfred’s rule of recognition the rule of recognition. There has to be 
something else. 
For Hart, that something else was efficacy.14 That is, the people in 
whose society the rule of recognition exists must generally comply with 
the laws validated by that rule of recognition. Of course, people comply 
with law to varying degrees and for all sorts of reasons. And they may 
comply without accepting as valid the laws the officials’ rule of 
recognition validates. Indeed, on the Hartian model, which Rick accepts, 
there may be more than one legal system purporting to govern a society. 
                                                                                                                     
9 Id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. at 190–91. 
12 HART, supra note 7, at 113. 
13 See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 2, at 178–79. See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW 
AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 107–09 (2018). 
14 HART, supra note 7, at 113. 
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French citizens in World War II may have divided over whether the laws 
of the Vichy government or the laws of the Free French government in 
exile should be obeyed when they conflicted.15 And if they divided over 
which laws to accept as valid, they perforce divided over who were really 
“officials.”16 
So, if, as Hart believed and as Rick and I believe, the content of the 
rule of recognition is an empirical question, it is a complex, messy, 
difficult empirical question. It will be a function, not just of the attitudes of 
a discrete group of officials, who are only officials because of their 
attitudes, but of the attitudes and beliefs of a much wider population. As I 
have said elsewhere, determining the content of the rule of recognition is 
perhaps the most difficult jurisprudential question for jurisprudes.17 
One consequence of the possibility of competing rules of recognition 
and thus competing legal systems within a single society is of relevance to 
us Americans today. Matthew Adler has pointed out that because legal 
actors from the Supreme Court Justices on down disagree about what 
makes a constitutional decision correct—what are the “truthmakers” of 
constitutional decisions—such a fundamental disagreement seems to entail 
that we lack a unified legal system and in a real sense lack law. Adler asks, 
“What would it take for one side in this debate to be [legally] correct and 
the other [legally] incorrect? How is that even possible given the very fact 
of debate?”18 
I shall come back to Adler’s question later when I turn to Rick’s 
account of proper constitutional interpretation. For there is a link between 
the methodologies of constitutional interpretation and the content of the 
rule of recognition. 
Kay goes on to point out several interesting aspects of 
preconstitutional rules. He distinguishes arguments that assume a certain 
such rule and thus that count as legal arguments from arguments about the 
desirability of this or that preconstitutional rule. The latter arguments 
cannot be legal arguments because what is legal depends upon the 
acceptance of a given preconstitutional rule.19 Kay also distinguishes 
“closed” and “open” preconstitutional rules. The latter leave open certain 
                                                                                                                     
15 René Cassin, Vichy or Free France?, 20 FOREIGN AFF. 102, 107–08 (1941). 
16 See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 2, at 178 n.16. 
17 See Alexander, Constitutional Theories, supra note 2, at 641–43. See also Alexander & 
Schauer, supra note 2, at 186–87. 
18 Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1115, 1136 (2012). See also Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: 
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 804–05 (2006). If we restrict ourselves 
to officialism, the answer to Adler’s question is that officials accept that whatever the Supreme Court 
decides is constitutional law is constitutional law. See Alexander, Who is Fred, supra note 2, at 326 
n.17. Until the Court decides, however, there is no shared constitutional law. See also Alexander & 
Schauer, supra note 2, at 184–86. 
19 Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 193. 
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issues of validity—issues that can be resolved in the future.20 He quotes 
Marbury v. Madison21 for an illustration of reliance on a closed 
preconstitutional rule, one in which the Constitution is to be understood as 
its authors intended it to be understood, which he says remains orthodox 
constitutional theory.22 And he contrasts this closed preconstitutional rule 
with the open one, a clear manifesto of juristocracy: “Properly 
promulgated government actions are valid if the Supreme Court does not 
disapprove them.”23 (Query: How on such a preconstitutional rule do we 
know in the absence of Supreme Court decisions what things are 
“government actions,” or when they are “properly promulgated”? And is 
the Supreme Court then only the Supreme Court because it tells us so?)24 
The choice between a closed and an open preconstitutional rule is a choice 
between fixity and flexibility; but it is also a choice between decision 
makers—the authors of the Constitution or the Supreme Court. 
Rick continued his discussion of preconstitutional rules in an article 
published six years after Preconstitutional Rules entitled The Illegality of 
the Constitution.25 In it, Rick illustrates the nature of rules of recognition 
by recounting how the United States went from being governed by the 
Articles of Confederation to being governed by the Constitution. The 
preconstitutional rule that legitimated the Articles, and acts legitimated by 
the Articles, did not validate the work of the constitutional convention and 
its proposed Constitution.26 The latter would only be legitimated by a 
different preconstitutional rule. And the argument for accepting a new 
preconstitutional rule, one that would legitimize the Constitution, could not 
be legal; for legal arguments are offered within whatever legal system the 
preconstitutional rule legitimizes and cannot be deployed to support 
preconstitutional rules themselves.27 The arguments for accepting a 
preconstitutional rule must be extra-legal, that is political and moral.28 
Ordinary legislative bodies also could not effect a change of 
preconstitutional rules, as they themselves are constituted under the 
existing preconstitutional rule and might have a different character and 
different powers under a new preconstitutional rule.29 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                     
20 Id. at 195.  
21 5 U.S. 137, 176–79 (1803). 
22 Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 195–96. I agree with Kay that the position taken 
in Marbury remains orthodox constitutional theory, and in the concluding section of this Essay I will 
explain why that is so. 
23 Id. at 197. 
24 See Stephen E. Sachs, The Law and Morals of Interpretation, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 103, 105 (2018). 
25 Kay, Illegality, supra note 1. 
26 Id. at 67. 
27 Id. at 70.  
28 Id. at 70–77. 
29 Id. at 72. 
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ratifying conventions and popular acceptance of the new regime over time 
legitimated the preconstitutional rule that recognized the Constitution as 
supreme law.30 
Thus, the emergence of a new preconstitutional rule is a revolution, a 
change of regimes, the establishment of a new legal order.31 Rick 
concludes as follows: 
The main point to be learned from an examination of the 
beginnings of the Constitution, is not the fitness of one or 
another preconstitutional rule. On the contrary, it shows that 
we cannot settle on a correct position in this regard as a 
matter of law or logic. The creation of, or change in, the 
preconstitutional rule will reflect the needs and values of the 
time in which it is effective and will draw its legitimacy from 
its conformity with those needs and values. And since that 
legitimacy is always a current matter, any preconstitutional 
rule is always provisional, subject to change when social and 
political factors require it. The great change of 1787-89 was 
obvious because it involved an alteration of both the 
preconstitutional rule and formal accoutrements of that rule, 
the Articles of Confederation and the institutions of 
government created under it. Similar changes which leave the 
formal aspects of the legal system untouched may not 
command our attention in the same way but they surely 
occur. It is the possibility of such changes that makes 
sensible our continuing discussion about constitutional 
fundamentals. In this respect we are always in a situation like 
the one that confronted the founders in 1787-89.32 
Rick’s conception of preconstitutional rules, the rules that legitimate 
legal regimes, and thus the statues of officials within them, is that they 
exist by virtue of their broad acceptance by the governed, not by virtue of 
acceptance solely by officials. For, as pointed out, officials are such only 
because the legal regime in question deems them to be, and their 
bootstrapping acceptance of that regime cannot legitimize it in the absence 
of much broader social acceptance. And when the legal regime is no longer 
accepted as legitimate by enough people, then the legitimating 
preconstitutional rule, the rule of recognition, no longer exists, even if it is 
still accepted by officials of the old regime. In such circumstances, the 
society has entered a revolutionary period, one in which the content of the 
                                                                                                                     
30 Id. at 72–73. See id. at 77–79; Alexander and Schauer, supra note 2, at 180–81. 
31 Kay, Illegality, supra note 1, at 61. 
32 Id. at 80 (footnote omitted). 
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preconstitutional rule is now up for grabs, and in which it is possible that 
different legal regimes will purport to govern the same society. 
Rick calls the authority of constitution makers that is derived from a 
preconstitutional rule accepted by the people “constituent authority.”33 He 
has written a lot about constituent authority, distinguishing constitutions 
that were effectively created legally, that is, under the rules of a legal 
regime that continued to exist but no longer governed the polity under the 
new constitution, from constitutions that were the products of revolutions. 
The latter resulted from changes in the preconstitutional rules and replaced 
one legal regime with another. The U.S. Constitution was, as mentioned, a 
revolutionary constitution and replaced the Articles of Confederation 
without being organically derived from the Articles. 
Rick’s article Constituent Authority is a study of constitutional 
changes, revolutionary or not, in a multitude of countries.34 But the 
constitutional change that intrigued him as much as the revolutionary one 
that produced the U.S. Constitution was the English Revolution of 
1688-89, which was illegal under the extant legal regime, but during which 
the participants went to great lengths to deny its illegality.35 As Rick puts 
it: 
Every new regime must conform to critical social and 
political values in the population it intends to govern. 
Sometimes, however, a core value in such a society is the 
value of legality itself. When that is the case we can expect 
the kind of paradoxical appeal to legality illustrated by the 
Revolution of 1688-89. 
In 1688 Britain, the political nation was law-saturated . . . . 
How, in such an environment, can one make a revolution? 
The answer, as the remarkably successful results of 1688-89 
testify, is very carefully. At every point the departures from 
law were minimized and disguised. William III, as much as 
any of his subjects, understood the necessity for this 
approach.36 
II. KAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Rick belongs to that small but righteous group of scholars who endorse 
original intended meaning as the proper quarry of constitutional 
interpretation (and, indeed, of legal interpretation more generally). That 
                                                                                                                     
33 See Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 1, at 716. 
34 Id. 
35 See KAY, GLORIOUS, supra note 1, at I; Kay, William III, supra note 1, at 1645–47. 
36 Kay, William III, supra note 1, at 1664. 
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group includes, to my knowledge, in addition to Rick, Stanley Fish,37 
Steven Knapp,38 Walter Benn Michaels,39 Stephen Neale,40 Saikrishna 
Prakash,41 Scott Soames,42 and myself.43 (I would add Richard Ekins to the 
list were he an American interested in constitutional interpretation, as his 
view of statutory interpretation is identical to the view of those listed 
above.44) 
Original intended meaning (OIM) originalists are a tiny branch of the 
much larger camp of constitutional originalists, the rest of whom now call 
themselves original public meaning (OPM) originalists. I have written that 
there is likely no difference between these groups because the hypothetical 
reasonable interpreter at the time the Constitution was promulgated—the 
construct used by OPM originalists—would himself be seeking the original 
intended meaning.45 Moreover, the problem of aggregating intended 
meanings in group authored documents like the Constitution will dog the 
OPM originalists to the same extent as it dogs OIM originalists such as 
Rick and me. 
Rick’s adherence to OIM in constitutional interpretation is 
longstanding and well documented.46 Mine in print goes back to 1995.47 I 
shall explain my views on interpretation briefly, views that I believe Rick 
shares jot and tittle. 
I begin with the nature of texts. A text, as I shall be using the term, is a 
set of symbols - of any kind - that is meant by its producer - the author(s) - 
to communicate a message to the intended audience. The symbols used can 
be marks, sounds, dots and dashes, smoke, flags, pictures - indeed, 
anything can be used as symbols capable of conveying messages. And 
although we are usually interested in the actual authors of a text, texts 
produced by one author can be appropriated by another author to convey 
the same or a different message. And one can meaningfully ask what 
                                                                                                                     
37 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 632–33 
(2005). 
38 See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 651, 655 (2005). 
39 See, e.g., id.; Walter Benn Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REV. 765, 773 
(1982). 
40 See, e.g., Stephen Neale, Convergentism and the Nature of Law 1, 1, 5 (Mar. 14, 2013) 
(unpublished draft). 
41 See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2. 
42 See, e.g., Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 
231, 241 (2011). 
43 See publications listed in note 2. 
44 See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–2 (2012). 
45 Alexander, Goldsworthy, supra note 2, at 8–11. 
46 For articles showing Kay’s adherence to OIM in constitutional interpretation, see publications 
listed in note 1. 
47 Alexander, All or Nothing at All, supra note 2. 
 
2021] THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND INTENTIONALIST INTERPRETATION 1523 
message a text would convey if it had been produced, not by its actual 
author, but by some different author. 
If there is no author - no person who produced the marks, sounds, etc. 
in order to convey a message - then we do not have a text.48 The marks, 
sounds, etc. may be a sign of something, much as smoke is a sign of fire, or 
geese flying south are a sign that winter is coming.49 Marks that might look 
like symbols, when we understand they are not—think of cloud formations 
that resemble the letters C-A-T—render certain questions nonsensical that 
would make sense were there an author. (Consider: Are the clouds 
speaking English or French? Are they referring to all felines or only to 
tabby cats?) Even when there is an author and a text, the text may be a sign 
of something other than the message conveyed. For example, the text may 
be a sign that the author has poor handwriting or can use word processing. 
Or its message may be a sign that the author was angry, or agitated, or in 
love. 
Texts are individuated by the messages that their authors are intending 
to convey thereby. That is why the text of the U.S. Constitution in Spanish 
can be the same as its text in English, or why its text in one font can be the 
same as its text in a different font. Even though those tokens of the text 
differ from one another, they are tokens of the same text if the message 
they convey is the same.50 
                                                                                                                     
48 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 2, at 976; Michaels, supra note 39, at 774.  
49 For a similar point, see Kay, Original Intentions, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
50 Id. This point is quite important but always overlooked by those who argue for interpreting a 
text differently from its authors’ intended meaning but who also claim that they are not changing the 
text— what some call “informal amendment.” They overlook this point because they are misled by the 
fact that many words or phrases in a given language can bear more than one meaning in that language. 
(In truth, when words or phrases are decoupled from the meanings their authors intended, there is no 
limit to the meanings they can bear; any symbol can symbolize anything its author intends.) But when 
the text in question is translated into a different language, one in which the authors’ intended meaning 
is expressed in words or phrases different from those that express the new meaning, then the translated 
text with the new meanings will not be the same as the original text with the authors’ intended 
meanings. In other words, if word or phrase X can mean either A or B in conventional English, and the 
authors’ meaning A is changed to B, then even though the English text would remain the same (X), its 
translation into another language might change the text from Y to Z. So what appears in one language 
to be an unamended text will appear in another language to be an amended one. Alexander & Schauer, 
supra note 2, at 183–84 n.31. Informal amendment will therefore be shown to have been a formal one 
after all. And this is why “interpreting” the text to achieve some value rather than to retrieve authorial 
intended meaning is not interpretation but amendment by those without authority to amend. When 
Joseph Raz advocates “interpretations” that “improve” a constitution, he is blessing unauthorized 
amendments rather than interpretations. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON 
THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 354, 361 (2009). Likewise, when Justice Breyer urges 
courts to “interpret” the Constitution to achieve “active liberty,” he is advocating constitutional 
amendments by the judiciary. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 21–34 (2005). He is misled by the symbols remaining the same after such an 
“interpretation.” 
 
1524 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:5 
When our interest is in the actual authors of a text and the message that 
they intended to convey thereby, we are acting as “originalists.” If we are 
unsure of the meaning of some word in the text, then, given that our 
interest is in the message that the actual authors intended to convey, we 
will consult dictionaries contemporaneous with their authoring, not later 
dictionaries. And when their words produce an ambiguity, to resolve it we 
will ask about the context in which they were authoring, not about contexts 
that post or pre-date their authoring. 
The ‘conventional meanings’ of words—what meaning dictionaries 
would assign them—are merely the meanings most people at a particular 
time, and in a particular locale, would intend to convey by those words. 
These meanings are therefore time and place bound and can, and do, 
change over time and from place to place. But authors may and often do 
employ unconventional meanings. They may use codes, or idiolects, or 
malapropisms. If their intended audience understands the code or the 
idiolect that they are employing, or recognises the malapropism and its 
actual intended referent, then the authors can be successful in conveying 
their message to their intended audience. If one is interested in knowing 
what message the authors are intending to convey, one will want to know 
what code, idiolect, etc. the author is employing. 
Authors rely on implicatures and implicitures in conveying their 
intended messages. They often mean more, and sometimes less, than they 
actually say. “John and Mary are married,” uttered when they are observed 
walking together, usually conveys the message that they are married to 
each other. “It is an aggravating circumstance to use a gun in the 
commission of a crime” usually conveys the message that it is aggravating 
when the gun is used as a weapon but not as an item of barter for illegal 
drugs. 
Turning now from interpretation generally to the interpretation of legal 
texts, in whomever the authority to exact legal norms resides - in 
constitutional ratifiers, in legislatures, in administrators, in judges - then 
when they decide which norms to enact and attempt to communicate those 
norms through a written or oral text, the job of the intended audience is to 
figure out what norms the authors enacted and intended to communicate. If 
the audience chooses legal norms that differ from those which the authors 
chose to enact and communicate, the authority of the authors is 
undermined. Only originalism is authority preserving. Any departure from 
originalism either transfers authority from the authors to someone else—
for example, to judges—or to some mindless process, such as the process 
by which the meanings of words change over time, as would occur if 
contemporary dictionary meanings rather than the meanings 
contemporaneous with authorship were relied on in ‘interpreting’ legal 
texts. 
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Interpretation of legal texts is an empirical, not a normative, endeavor. 
The interpreter wants to know what norm the authorities intended to 
communicate through their text. It is often quite difficult to answer the 
interpreter’s question. The authorities may have expressed their intended 
norm poorly. Or the text may be old or ambiguous, and the context of its 
promulgation unclear or unknown. But however difficult interpretation 
may be, it is unavoidable if the norms that we are to be governed by are the 
norms intended by those with authority to govern us. 
Finally, interpretation of legal texts must deal with the fact that some 
legal authorities are multi-member bodies and sometimes bicameral 
multi-member bodies, and can only enact legal norms with the concurrence 
of majorities or super-majorities. What is the intended meaning of a legal 
text when the members who voted to enact it did not intend to convey the 
same meanings and hence the same norms by it? This is the aggregation 
problem. On my view, it cannot be avoided. And when there is no shared 
meaning that the requisite number of norm enactors endorse, then the text 
they enact is legal gibberish. It is a composite of different intended norms 
that cannot be combined into a single norm. Perhaps that unfortunate result 
is rare. Perhaps it can be avoided by having those who vote for the text 
accept the meaning intended by some person or committee without having 
that meaning in mind themselves. I see no way, however, to make the 
aggregation problem disappear without at the same time undermining the 
authority of those who are supposed to possess it.51 
As I read Rick’s copious writings on the topic, he would agree with 
everything I have said. It is worth quoting a passage from one of Rick’s 
earliest articles on constitutional interpretation: 
The Constitution became supreme law as a result of the 
regard in which its rules and the process for making those 
rules were held at the time of its promulgation—that is as a 
consequence of a widely shared political understanding as to 
the sources and limits of lawmaking power. Put too simply, 
the sequence of the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution was understood to express the will of “the 
people” in as clear a way as the institutions and traditions of 
that time permitted. And it was a political axiom of that day 
that all laws and constitutions were subject to revision or 
replacement by the sovereign people. The critical point for 
my purposes is that the Constitution as law cannot 
                                                                                                                     
51 The preceding discussion is similarly stated and examined further in Alexander, Goldsworthy, 
supra note 2, at 5–8. For Professor Kay’s shared view of the aggregation problem, see Richard S. Kay, 
American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 35–36 (Larry 
Alexander ed., 1998). 
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materialize out of the air. We come to regard certain 
language as the Constitution because of something about the 
way it was uttered. Who can disagree with Walter Benn 
Michaels that “[n]o one would even try to interpret the 
Constitution if everyone thought it had been put together by a 
tribe of monkeys with quills.” 
It is my position, therefore, that interpretation of the 
Constitution consistently with the intentions of its enactors is 
inseparable from a determination to treat the Constitution as 
law.52 
III. CONNECTING THE PRECONSTITUTIONAL RULE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Some have expressed the theory that in the United States, given 
differences in the way Justices of the Supreme Court, other judges and 
lawyers, and ordinary people interpret the Constitution, the conclusion to 
be drawn is that we lack a single preconstitutional rule. Instead, the reality 
is that we have several dueling preconstitutional rules, each recognizing a 
somewhat different legal system, and each purporting to be the legal 
system of the United States.53 
I think this concern is overblown. All federal officials, including 
Justices of the Supreme Court, recognize that they owe their official status 
to language in the 1789 Constitution and its original intended meaning. 
Moreover, officialdom accepts that Supreme Court constitutional decisions 
are to be treated within the legal system as if they are correct 
interpretations of the Constitution, even if they are otherwise regarded as 
misinterpretations.54 Finally, no justice or judge to my knowledge has ever 
asserted that he or she is not bound to adhere to the 1789 Constitution and 
its formal amendments, at least in the absence of a Supreme Court 
precedent that is viewed as erroneous but has yet to be overruled by the 
Court.55 
The source of the worry that we have a multitude of competing legal 
systems stems from assuming differing approaches to interpretation of the 
Constitution—originalism, textualism, and non-originalist, non-textualist 
approaches of varying types—are not just correct and incorrect ways to 
interpret the Constitution. For what is the Constitution to which everyone, 
                                                                                                                     
52 Kay, Original Intentions, supra note 1, at 45 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michaels, supra note 
39, at 774). 
53 See Adler, Interpretive Contestation, supra note 18, at 1119; Adler, Popular Constitutionalism, 
supra note 18, at 719–20. 
54 See Alexander, Who is Fred?, supra note 2, at 326 n.17.  
55 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2359 (2015). 
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originalists and others, swears fealty? It cannot be the parchment in the 
National Archives, with its various markings. Take away its authors and 
the meanings they intended to convey, and that piece of parchment and its 
markings could mean anything or nothing at all. For suppose we 
discovered it was produced by “monkeys with quills,”56 or a wind-caused 
ink spill. We would not anguish over the meaning of the marks because 
they would have no meaning. Mere marks cannot declare that they are a 
language, much less what language they are. We know the marks on the 
parchment are English, and American English of the late eighteenth 
century rather than modern English, Australian English, South African 
English, a special subculture’s dialect, or a Russian code masking as 
English. We know this because we know who its authors are and what they 
were about in producing this piece of parchment. But ignore their intended 
meanings, and that piece of parchment and its markings could mean 
anything or nothing.  
That is why Rick and I believe originalism of the intended meaning 
variety is the only game in town if one purports to be interpreting the 
Constitution—that is, the Constitution to which everyone, high or low, 
claims to swear allegiance. Our situation is not one where we have 
different competing constitutions recognized by different preconstitutional 
rules. Rather, we have a single preconstitutional rule that recognizes the 
Constitution of 1789 as fundamental law but simultaneously massive 
confusion about the implications for interpretation of that recognition. For 
the Constitution of 1789 is nothing other than its authors’ intended 
meanings—meanings that will remain the same no matter the language in 
which they are expressed. 
I have argued that the courts do regard the Constitution of 1789 and its 
formal amendments as fundamental law; that is their preconstitutional rule, 
and decisions that give the opposite impression are the product of judicial 
confusion regarding what it means to interpret the Constitution faithfully. 
But beyond officialdom, those whom Hart believed counted for identifying 
the rule of recognition, what does society at large believe is the 
preconstitutional rule? Of course, ordinary people—and even most judges 
and lawyers—don’t think about law in such terms. But Hart 
notwithstanding, the views of the people—the ruled—should count, at least 
if the officials of interest to Hart are to be regarded as legitimate and not 
just a gang imposing its will by force, whatever their internal point of view 
of their own rules’ legitimacy. 
I would hazard a guess that the vast majority of people assent to the 
courts’ constitutional decisions, not because they like all the results, but 
because they believe the justices and judges are attempting in good faith to 
                                                                                                                     
56 Kay, Original Intentions, supra note 1, at 45 (quoting Michaels, supra note 39, at 774). 
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apply the Constitution—the Constitution of 1789 and its formal 
amendments—and that, were they aware that the justices and judges were 
not doing this, but were instead making up rules and falsely declaring that 
these were based on the Constitution of 1789, the courts would lose their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.57 
And why, finally, should we follow the intended meanings of 
imperfect and unrepresentative persons from a time far different in many 
respects from our own? Surely, the Constitution they bequeathed us is 
defective in all sorts of ways.58 So why follow it? 
The answer has to be that, whatever its imperfections, the Constitution 
of 1789 is preferable to the alternatives. It settles matters that must be 
settled, and there is no alternative constitution around which we can all 
rally. There is no prospect of a bloodless coup in which the 
preconstitutional rule that recognizes the Constitution of 1789 is replaced 
by a different preconstitutional rule recognizing some other constitution or 
juristocracy. 
 
                                                                                                                     
57 See Alexander, Constitutional Theories, supra note 2, at 641–43. 
58 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 11 (2006). 
